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Knowledge of God is not an escape into the safe heights of pure ideas, but an entry 





THE PROBLEM OF RETRIBUTIVIST CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
When it comes to the practice of criminal punishment in the United States, 
there is a widespread retributivist spirit that haunts the nation’s courts, jails, and 
prisons. This retributivist spirit is expressive of a wider and all too pervasive 
violence and vengeance that characterize so much of American culture, and 
reveals an unfortunate bone-deep truth concerning human associations in 
general: no other creatures on earth engage in intra-species violence and other 
forms of harm as routinely, intensely, and wantonly as do human beings. We 
humans consistently display a will-to-power that far exceeds our basic need to 
survive and flourish comfortably. This basic fact of associational human life is 
frequently on display in both the commission of crimes and in the state-
sanctioned retributive measures meant to punish wrongdoing. From petty 
robbery, felony rape, and murder, to the willful neglect of the basic survival 
needs of the earth’s most vulnerable persons, to the monstrous narratives of 
genocide that routinely accompany human history, to the routine violence and 
degradation faced by prisoners (while in prison), the shadow side of human 
existence requires continuous considerations of “effective remedies” that serve 
to mitigate, if not halt, the all too routine aggression and neglect homo sapiens 
inflict on one another and the rest of creation. 
Whether we are speaking of more localized street-level assaults on human 
persons or crimes against humanity, the development and codification of 
criminal laws, by civil authorities and among nations, is intended to aid and 
vindicate various understandings and outcomes of justice. Yet laws aimed at 
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securing justice (variously understood) routinely inflict punishment on guilty 
parties. “Punishment” should be understood here as the application of officially 
sanctioned harm, suffering, or some other remedy of unpleasantness (not 
necessarily pain) as means of retribution; that is, paying back the offence, or 
evening the score, in the service of satisfying the requirements of retributivist 
justice. Such punishments in this society may include imprisonment  (where 
hate, anger, and vindictiveness commonly fester) as well as state-sponsored 
execution. 
Although societal theories of punishment that are other than retributive 
influence thinking about crime and punishment, retribution characterizes the 
fundamental (even if unintended) function of criminal punishment in the 
United States. Other classic aims of criminal sanction are of course present as 
well; they include deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation, reform, and 
incapacitation. Nonetheless, the bedrock of U.S. penal theory and practice is 
retribution. It is commonly held by criminal justice authorities, victims of crime, 
politicians, and the general public that “paying back the offence,” or “just 
desert,” requires the infliction of suffering and/or pain that is proportional to 
the offence as a method best suited to satisfying the requirements of justice. 
This retributive punishment, which is the leading impulse of criminal justice in 
the United States, is at fundamental odds with a peaceable Christian approach 
to punishment. 
A major difficulty with our society’s criminal justice efforts today is that we 
not only send offenders to prison as punishment, we also send them there for 
punishment. 
When disproportionately large numbers of young black and Latino men are 
doing time in overcrowded, single-sex, racist, ethnocentric, and routinely violent 
institutions of social vengeance and degradation, it is not reasonable, on 
balance, to expect positive contributions from them when they return to their 
families, communities, and to society at large. The use of incarceration as a 
principal means of criminal punishment, on a scale as unprecedented as that in 
the United States, has not achieved a significantly less fearful or safer society. 
Indeed, with just five percent of the world’s population, the United States holds 
roughly a quarter of its prisoners.2 
Not only might one question the nation’s reliance on imprisoning such a 
large portion of its population relative to the rest of the world, one might also 
wish to discern the extent to which mass incarceration as social policy 
significantly transforms the nation’s own best expectations for itself. The 
 
 2.  See THE AMERICAN PRISON SYSTEM at vii (Peter G. Herman ed., 2001); Adam Liptak, Inmate 
Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html?pagewanted=all. In 2009 The Pew Center on the 
States compiled information from Justice Department and Census Bureau statistics, with a conclusion 
that, “[t]he United States has 5 percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world’s prison 
inmates.” Study: 7.3 Million in U.S. Prison System in ‘07, CNN (Mar. 2, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/ 
2009-03-02/justice/record.prison.population_1_prison-system-prison-population-corrections?_s=PM: 
CRIME. 
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increased scale of incarceration over more than three decades has an impact 
that extends far broader than just individual victims, prisoners, and their 
families. The collateral consequences of society’s reliance on large-scale 
incarceration as a primary means of achieving “criminal justice” include the 
exacerbation of racial divisions, broad-scale economic hardship, and economic 
and social risk for the most vulnerable of the nation’s residents, particularly 
children, the homeless, the mentally and emotionally ill, the jobless, and the 
drug-addicted. In addition, incarceration on such a large scale poses 
fundamental questions of justice, fairness, and citizenship in a democratic 
society.3 
II 
DRAWING FROM STANLEY HAUERWAS 
In light of this all too brief articulation of the nation’s unfortunate allegiance 
to retributive punishment, Christian moral theology focused on criminal justice 
contributes to society by imagining and translating something of the 
“peaceable” virtues of “good punishment” into better state-sponsored practices 
of criminal justice. I hope to persuade civil authorities and the public to pursue 
forms of criminal sanction that do not function under the alienating spell of 
retribution as the primary purposeful aim of punishment. For the past several 
years, I have been developing and refining a theological ethics of good 
punishment most significantly by way of a reconstructive critique of Stanley 
Hauerwas’s theological ethics of punishment.4 
Central to Christian theological perspectives on criminal punishment is the 
requirement of discerning the difference Jesus Christ makes for Christian 
understanding and possible participation in society’s meting out of punishment. 
I advance here a thesis significantly indebted to Hauerwas’s work; a Christian 
praxis of good punishment offers a healing politics of better hope for society’s 
practice of criminal justice. Good punishment, as an embodied Christian praxis, 
involves a particular story-informed and worshipful practice of “healing 
memory” in the service of “ontological intimacy.” Essentially, good punishment 
involves a peaceable Christian politics of healing the memories of wrongdoing 
by way of the acknowledgement of sin within a communal setting of forgiveness 
and reconciliation. Ontological intimacy is the Christian confession that all 
things participate in the power of God’s being through bonds of radical 
communion. A Christian theological grammar of ontological intimacy confesses 
that all that exists does so because of a deeply rooted, primordial communion 
with God.5 This is a Christian confession of profound interrelatedness. 
 
 3.  See Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, Introduction, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 1–2 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney Lind 
eds., 2002). 
 4.  See JAMES LOGAN, GOOD PUNISHMENT?: CHRISTIAN MORAL PRACTICE AND U.S. 
IMPRISONMENT 143 (2008). 
 5.  Here Hauerwas is drawing on Archbishop Francis Cardinal George’s “Catholic Christianity 
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Ontological intimacy is the goal that peaceable Christians strive for in our 
worshipful practices of healing memories. Christian practices aimed at healing 
the memories of sin, in the service of our divinely grounded ontological 
intimacy, anchor the Christian understanding and practice of good punishment. 
Christian good punishment offers a model of good news to a society racked by 
so much anxiety and violence associated with the common human fear of crime. 
It is a worshipful community’s good news of suffering presence and peaceable 
character in the face of violence and death. 
III 
POLITICS OF HEALING MEMORY AS GOOD PUNISHMENT 
A fundamental theological dimension of Hauerwas’s ethics of punishment is 
his insistence that “‘sin and forgiveness’ names the realities that make the 
Christian commitment to peace intelligible.”6 Ontologically, argues Hauerwas, 
crime is a subset of sin. Since the Christian narrative of Jesus ultimately 
highlights forgiveness over sin, forgiveness must be viewed as a more 
determinative reality than punishment. God does not punish us for our sin 
according to Hauerwas. On his view, sin is self-inflicted punishment that is 
healed through “reconciliation with God, ourselves, and our wronged 
neighbor.”7 The acknowledgment of sin is made possible through reconciliation. 
The reality of sin, forgiveness, and reconciliation is a realism constituting the 
heart of the Christian commitment to nonviolence according to Hauerwas, who 
insists that 
Christians are not committed to nonviolence because we believe nonviolence is an 
effective strategy to free the world of war. Rather, we are nonviolent because we 
know we live in a world at war yet believe that the forgiveness wrought on the cross of 
Christ makes it possible for us to live nonviolently in a world at war. In like manner 
we know we do not live in a world free of murder. Indeed, like advocates of just war, 
we know how important it is to distinguish between murder and other ways life is 
taken. Yet we also know that God’s forgiveness is not only for those who are the 
victims of murder but for murderers.
8
 
Hauerwas goes on to insist that a peaceable Christian understanding of 
punishment cannot avoid grappling with the common human instinct for 
vengeance. Hauerwas’s Christian alternative to vengeance is a form of justice 
which purifies vengeance. The theological content of such justice “is the name 
and confession: Jesus is the Christ of God. Jesus Christ is the language that ends 
the silences that threaten to destroy us. Christ is the memory that makes 
possible the memory of the wrongs we have done as well as [the wrongs] that 
 
and the Millennium: Frontiers of the Mind in the 21st Century,” p. 2, which is a manuscript copy of the 
Archbishop’s speech he received from a friend. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, A BETTER HOPE: 
RESOURCES FOR A CHURCH CONFRONTING CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND POSTMODERNITY 11–
12 (2000). 
 6.  Id. at 209.  
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Id. 
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have been done to us.”9 
Notwithstanding Hauerwas’s call for Christians to embody a peaceable form 
of justice which purifies vengeance, he does correctly point out in his work that 
even Christians committed to nonviolence do reach out to each other in a 
manner that some may call punishment. However, the proper name given by 
Christians to punishment understood as a politics of healing memory is not 
retribution. Rather, the name given to Christian punishment is 
“excommunication” or “binding and loosing.” To have one’s offense confronted 
by one’s sisters and brothers because of sin is a call to reconciliation. For 
Hauerwas, penance and forgiveness are critical components of reconciliation. 
The Christian version of excommunication advanced by Hauerwas is one which 
calls offenders home to be reunited with the community of sinners called the 
church. Indeed, Hauerwas’s understanding of excommunication should not be 
confused with practices of exclusion that have often signaled the utter spiritual 
condemnation of persons over the centuries in many Catholic and Protestant 
religious contexts. Critically for Hauerwas, it is in the context of the peaceable 
worship of God that healing memories and excommunication gain 
intelligibility.10 
IV 
THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD PUNISHMENT IN LIBERAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
I have been attempting to translate aspects of the peaceable Christian 
witness of good punishment in the wider civil society—something, by the way, 
Hauerwas tends to frown upon. Within this context, I have imagined the 
following: The Christian conception of sin as “alienation” (or estrangement) in 
the wider public domain. I have also tried to reimagine incarceration itself in 
terms of a forgiving and reconciling Christian practice of excommunication. 
It would be fair to say that the church’s practice of excommunication, as an 
expression of good punishment, constitutes good news for the society insofar as 
it offers a peaceable counter-witness against the violence of human alienation. 
Such a counter-witness has, at least, important pragmatic implications for 
society. Indeed, in a society where an underlying ethos of “vulgar 
individualism” reigns, the Christian practice of “excommunication” teaches 
important lessons concerning the common bonds of human mutuality—for 
better or worse. More to the point though, the Christian practice of 
excommunication, translated at the level of state-sanctioned punishment, 
suggests that even convicted felons ought to be viewed as inextricably bonded 
to the human family. Even those society marks as felons ought not be viewed as 
trespassers on the human race. While it is true that offenders must take 
individual responsibility for the crimes they commit, their crimes ought not be 
 
 9.  Id. at 146. 
 10.  See, e.g., STANELY HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH: BONHOEFFER AND THE 
PRACTICE OF NONVIOLENCE 185 (2004).  
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viewed as estranged from the wider and complex family, communal, and social 
dynamics that produce and reproduce crime and the necessity to punish. 
Hauerwas might have some real concerns with this proposition. After all, 
excommunication as a practice of punishment grounded in the peaceable, 
forgiving, and reconciling narrative and politics of Jesus has no corollary within 
a liberal civil society. While Christians practice punishment undergirded by the 
indispensable development of story-informed communities of character, which 
are grounded in Jesus Christ, liberal societies share no such common ground. 
Therefore, civil discernments and arguments about “punishment,” and 
“justice,” and “peace” inevitably end in intractable disagreements. As much as 
it may be argued that liberal society offers a moral tradition of democracy, 
which provides a commonly understood background of agreement concerning 
“equal dignity,” “inalienable rights,” and “justice for all,” and is founded on the 
voluntary consent of individuals, who are allegedly born free and independent, 
the real difficulty is that the nation’s powerful currents of individualism and 
general lack of common civic character development (except in times of 
national crisis), will make forgiving and reconciling practices of punishment 
difficult at best. We as a nation are apparently more comfortable practicing 
forms of punishment that alienate us from one another. Instead of healing our 
memories of crime in the service of reconciliation, we tend to punish in a 
manner that turns us away from our better mutual affections for one another 
whenever the violence of crime makes visit upon us. 
All of this notwithstanding, peaceable Christianity offers glimpses of a 
better way in the society in which we live. When it comes to criminal 
punishment, one way forward might be to forge common agreement that views 
the fact of incarceration itself—that is, the physical loss of freedom—as the sole 
“punishing” dimension of incarceration. In other words, convicted offenders 
ought to be sent to prison as punishment and not for punishment. With this 
basic civil commitment in place, healing the memories of the crimes committed 
by those confined to prisons as punishment will entail the development of 
virtues and practices that help offenders re-enter society better than when they 
were removed. This will mean the development of widespread civic virtues that 
lead to practices committed to addiction, mental health, and educational efforts 
aimed at the transformation of those marked as criminals. So too might healing 
the memories of crimes mean working toward returning most offenders to a 
society of living wages in employment, safe and secure housing, strong medical 
and mental health access, a sound education, and the dismantling of institutions 
that profit from the incarceration of human bodies. While such efforts toward 
good punishment will never wipe out the memories of crime, a “reconciled 
memory” (a transformative “coming to better terms with the memories of 
crime”) may well result if offenders become more productive residents of the 
communities and civil society in which we all share. Indeed, incarceration in the 
wider civil society, like excommunication in the church, ought to be an occasion 
for inviting offenders to reconciled human associations. The tragic memories of 
crime would be further aided if the resources that were brought to bear for the 
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positive transformation of offenders were also made available to the victims of 
crime and/or their families, as well as to those workers who administer 
corrections on the front lines of criminal justice. 
Another sign of the Christian practice of healing memories carried into the 
civil imagination is restorative justice. All too briefly articulated, models of 
restorative justice represent a more systemic, peaceable witness that Christians, 
and others, contribute to a society way too committed to the violence of 
retributive punishment. Restorative justice is a phrase that “encompasses a 
variety of programs and practices” based on an “alternative framework for 
thinking about wrongdoing.”11 Restorative justice is community-based and deals 
with offenders through a victim-oriented process of restoration.12 Restorative 
approaches to criminal justice, in opposition to retributive frameworks, reject 
the idea that it is primarily the infliction of suffering and pain that will vindicate 
wrongdoing. While it is not unusual for victims (or their surrogates) and 
offenders to meet at some point during a restorative justice process, prominent 
proponents of restorative justice assert that forgiveness and reconciliation are 
not primary goals. Nonetheless, the context does provide a setting where some 
degree of either or both might occur. Restorative justice advocates should 
include forgiveness and reconciliation as stated goals where at all possible. 
It should be noted that restorative justice practitioners do not necessarily 
view restorative justice as an alternative to the state’s normal criminal justice 
process. In some felony cases—rape, murder, and domestic violence, for 
example—the framework may prove less useful or desirable. This 
notwithstanding, the usefulness of restorative justice has sometimes been 
apparent even in the most serious of felony cases. At base, restorative justice, as 
an alternative lens through which peaceable Christians engage prison reform, 
expresses values that comport to a better Christian vision for society. Such 
values include a respect for all persons, enemies included. It is an approach to 
justice that acknowledges both the individuality and radical interconnectedness 
of all persons. According to Howard Zehr, one of the nation’s leading 
advocates of restorative justice, restorative justice 
argues that what truly vindicates is acknowledgement of victims’ harms and needs, 
combined with an active effort to encourage offenders to take responsibility, make 
right the wrongs, and address the causes of their behavior. By addressing this need for 
vindication in a positive way, restorative justice has the potential to affirm both victim 
and offender and to help them transform their lives.
13
 
Such transformation means that memories of crime will need to be healed, 
although not forgotten. Healing the memories of crime in the service of 
forgiveness and reconciliation will be very difficult because memories of 
criminal offences soak us with so many unresolved and justified feelings of 
anxiety, rage, vengeance, fear, and helplessness. 
 
 11.  HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 5 (2002). 
 12.  Id. at 24. 
 13.  Id. at 59. 
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V 
LEARNING TO REMEMBER WELL 
As Hauerwas rightly suggests in his work, when Christians practice good 
punishment as excommunication they understand that while memories of sin 
cannot be denied or forgotten, the politics of healing memory breaks the link 
between offense and death, bringing to an end the history of violence. God 
upsets the logic and power of violence by forgiving humanity for its sin, 
including humanity’s own grand execution of God’s Son Jesus Christ. It is 
precisely because this most horrendous of crimes is not forgotten by God that a 
grace-soaked forgiveness is made possible. Hauerwas affirms that, 
“[f]orgiveness is not forgetfulness, it maintains the offending past in all its 
concreteness; nor is it lax, it calls for conversion.”14 He maintains that it is the 
Christian God that makes it possible for the church to be a community of 
memory, for the church is “God’s memory for the world.” God’s memory for 
the world, then, involves “not forgetting but having our memories transformed 
through the discovery that our sins cannot determine God’s will for our lives.”15 
Hauerwas’s basic theological argument here is that the church best exemplifies 
its witness to the world when it remembers itself as a tradition committed to 
being a living testimony to the difference Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection 
makes in the world. Against societal convention the church is to embody 
peaceableness. As a holy people, the church understands its gift to society as 
that of modeling suffering love and endurance. Moreover, Hauerwas contends 
that Christian reconciliation is deeply illiberal; it is an idea fundamentally at 
odds with society’s liberal, social–political arrangements. This is because 
members of the church, that is, the Body of Christ, know themselves not in the 
first instance as free and autonomous individuals pursuing happiness under a 
social contract but, rather, as bound to God, to their tradition, and to one 
another. According to Hauerwas, the problem with all forms of liberal social–
political arrangements is that they tempt Christians to falsely believe that 
freedom and rationality are independent of narrative—that is, that we are free 
to the extent we have no story. It is the memoriless contractual ethos of 
liberalism, with its supreme valuation of individual freedom, which destroys 
Christian virtue in Hauerwas’s view. 
Now, of course, much of what Hauerwas contends makes it difficult to 
translate the Christian politics of healing memories into a better hope for 
society, beyond offering a model of suffering endurance and love largely 
unattainable in a society grounded upon a social contract rather than on 
worshipful covenant. While acknowledging powerful dimensions of truthfulness 
in Hauerwas’s assessment of the way things are, one can nonetheless try to 
imagine some possibilities of correspondence. After all, even Hauerwas 
 
 14.  See HAUERWAS, supra note 5, at 151; Christian Duquoc, The Forgiveness of God, 184 
CONCILIUM INTN’L J. THEOLOGY 35, 42 (1986). 
 15.  HAUERWAS, supra note 5, at 152–53. 
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contends that, although the world does not share the Christian faith and 
therefore cannot be expected to live as Christians ought to live, this in no way 
means that a sectarian demarcation should be established indicating what 
Christians cannot ask of the societies in which they find themselves. Christians 
should actively model the peaceable politics of Jesus as a gift to the societies in 
which they live. But where societal practices do not conform to the peaceable 
politics of Jesus, Christian communities are duty bound not to participate. 
While the best way forward in all this is not clear, one hope is that both the 
children of liberal contracts and the children of worshipful covenants might find 
in our punishing practices occasions to embrace versions of healing memory in 
the service of common ontological intimacy. With regard to the victims of crime 
in particular, a politics of healing memory in the context of the most 
unspeakably anguished and gruesome experiences of crime will take much 
patience and time. It will take time for families and communities to participate 
in anything like forgiveness and reconciliation when forced to face “the mother 
who can’t sleep, tormented by wondering if her slain daughter’s last cry was 
‘Mama’”; “the jogger who can’t forget the crack of her nose breaking just 
before her rapist beat her into unconsciousness”; “the devoted Catholic who . . . 
can’t quite shed his rage at the man in cowboy boots who stomped his elderly 
mother to death nearly thirty years ago”; or “the woman who goes away each 
Christmas because that’s the season when her ex-husband stabbed their son and 
daughter, then killed himself.”16 These are the real memories that cry out for a 
difficult and effective justice that is soaked in revolutionary healing and 
reconciliation, but does not forget. Indeed, effective healing in the service of 
ontological intimacy must deal seriously, yet transformatively, with those who 
commit violent and death dealing crime. 
Such a society must also deal transformatively with its own civic self. It must 
deal with the punishing and ubiquitous narratives of inhumanity that routinely 
emerge out of the nation’s prisons; like the story of a self-described “Black 
punk,” who while in prison had another inmate enter through his cell door after 
paying off a guard to unlock it. Of the Puerto Rican inmate who entered his 
cell, the anonymous Black punk tells his readers that 
this dude was BIG and he just walked right into my cell and told me he was going to 
fuck my sweet ass. I got up real fast and tried to run out the cell but he grabbed me by 
the hair and punched me in the face. I remember that I was bleeding from the nose 
and suddenly I was on the bunk, pants off and my legs were on his shoulders. 
He told me that he liked his girls Black and that he wanted me to be his girl. I agreed 
to the arrangement and was his punk for the whole year I was there. He was into s & 
m, which was my first experience with that shit. It was my first experience with ride 
the whip’ too. He would invite his buddies (Whites and Puerto Ricans) to his cell 
where I would be forced to sit on his lap with his dick up my ass. Then he would 
masturbate me while his friends would take turns raping my mouth. God, even now 
I’m humiliated telling anyone about that . . . . I learned that I had to do everything a 
 
 16.  Cindi Lash, Emotional Struggles of Crime Victims Showcased in New Play, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, May 2, 2004, at C-1; Cf. HOWARD ZEHR, TRANSCENDING: REFLECTIONS OF CRIME 
VICTIMS (2001). 
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wife did and my existence depended on his contentment. If I resisted his little torture 
scenes, he would beat me and I would wind up doing it anyway.17 
It cannot be denied that both inside and outside prison such episodes of 
horrendous crime reflect the worse kinds of human animal aggression occurring 
each day in the United States. And it is critical that any Christian contemplating 
the radical nature of Christian penance, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the 
service of ontological intimacy faces the memory of such acts dead on. 
Christians, who are all too human, with trembling rage, fear, and anxiety, must 
stare into the pale dead face of misery on account of such acts and confront our 
understandable blood-thirst for revenge and retribution with the memory of an 
executed-yet-living God to guide us while living at the crossroads of Good 
Friday and Easter. As for the civil authorities and the wider liberal order, what 
common narrative(s) of civil virtue will ultimately guide them toward healing 




 17.  Anonymous, The Story of A Black Punk, in PRISON MASCULINITIES, 129 (Don Sabo, Terry A. 
Kupers & Willie London eds., 2001). 
